Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age Should Be a Factor in Sentencing for First Degree Murder by Felcher, Benjamin L.
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 2
2000
Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell
and Why Age Should Be a Factor in Sentencing for
First Degree Murder
Benjamin L. Felcher
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin L. Felcher, Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age Should Be a Factor in Sentencing for First Degree
Murder, 18 Law & Ineq. 323 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol18/iss2/2
Kids Get the Darndest Sentences:
State v. Mitchell and Why Age Should Be a




On October 21, 1996, the State of Minnesota sentenced a
fifteen-year-old boy charged with murder to serve life in prison.2
The court imposed this sentence on Eric Mitchell, a young boy
whose physically abusive mother kicked him out of their home,
who suffered from auditory hallucinations, and who attempted
suicide several times.3 The judge who sentenced Mitchell felt that
the day of sentencing was the "darkest day" he had ever known.4
The judge executed the sentence because the Minnesota statutes
require life in prison for first degree murder.5 Eric Mitchell
appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, arguing that the
application of a life sentence was cruel and unusual punishment
as applied to a fifteen-year-old child.6
In State v. Mitchell,7 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
sentencing a fifteen-year-old boy to life in prison with no
1. J.D. University of Minnesota, expected 2001. M.A. American History, State
University of New York at Buffalo, 1996. B.A. Oberlin College, 1992. I would like
to thank Carousel Bayrd, Rachael Baumel and Bryce Nixon for their invaluable
help; Professor Barry Feld for both specific comments and general lessons; Amy
Williams for providing a miracle every day; my mother and father for their
unflagging support through trials tougher than the writing of this Article; and, of
course, Aaron and Nathan.
2. See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W. 2d 481, 486 (Minn. 1998).
3. See id. at 486-87.
4. Id. at 487-88.
5. See id. The judge stated that he had a "responsibility beyond what I
personally feel," and found it his legal duty to impose the statutorily mandated
sentence. Id. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines separate first degree murder
from all other offenses and specify that life imprisonment shall be imposed upon
those found guilty of the crime. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(2)(A)
(1999). (stating that "[flirst degree murder is excluded from The Sentencing
Guidelines, because by law the sentence is mandatory imprisonment for life").
6. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 488; see also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5
(prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment).
7. Id. at 481.
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possibility of parole for thirty years did not constitute "cruel or
unusual" punishment for constitutional purposes. 8 In so doing, the
court held that Mitchell did not have a fundamental right to have
his age considered at sentencing in adult court.9 The court also
emphasized that the power to permit age considerations in
sentencing decisions resides in the legislature. 10 This Article will
argue that although Mitchell was a correct legal decision, the case
highlights the need for legislative change: the legislature should
require the judiciary to consider age as a mitigating factor when
sentencing children processed in adult court.
The Mitchell court relied on Minnesota's waiver process" to
address the potential differences between juvenile and adult
offenders.' 2 A child transferred to adult court, according to such
reliance, has received substantive and procedural constitutional
protection. 13 This conclusion not only gives short shrift to the
extent of difference between adults and children but also ignores
the reality of the waiver process: the certification process gives
little consideration to the sentence that a child will receive in
adult court.14 When waiving a child to adult court, the juvenile
court often gives most weight to the state's interest in public safety
and to the child's amenability to treatment. 15 There is, in other
8. Id. at 488. The Minnesota Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual
punishment, so a Minnesota court need not find a punishment "unusual" in order to
find it unconstitutional. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).
9. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 491.
10. See id.
11. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reforn" The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 629, n.13 (1998) (noting that the procedure for prosecuting a
chronological minor in the adult criminal system is variously referred to as one of
several synonymous terms: "waiver," "certification," "bindover" and "transfer").
Minnesota courts use the term "certification" most often, reflecting the statutory
language. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2000) (using the word "certification"
throughout the section); see, e.g., In re Welfare of KA.P., 550 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (using "certification" throughout the opinion). But see State v. Behl, 564
N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1997) (referring to the procedure as "waiver"). This Article
will use the terms "waiver" and "certification" interchangeably.
12. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 491.
13. See id. at 491-92.
14. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(4) (2000) (setting out role of "public safety" in
certification proceeding). Presumptive certification, applicable to only 16- or 17-
year-olds, is the only place in the statute where sentencing is mentioned. See
MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(3)(2) (2000) (establishing presumptive certification where
child's offense carries presumptive prison time under adult sentencing guidelines).
15. See In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 137-40 (Minn. 1980) (finding
that only issues for a certification hearing are public safety and the child's
amenability to treatment); State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 189-94 (Minn. 1977)
(court need only find either threat to public safety or a lack of amenability to
treatment to approve a certification to adult court).
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words, no requirement that the juvenile court consider the
possibility that a grossly disproportionate sentence looms in the
child's adult court future.
Criminal courts in Minnesota are not empowered to consider
age as a mitigating factor in sentencing for first degree murder.
This lack of consideration is especially problematic in Minnesota
because of the state's professed desire for a rational sentencing
policy, a desire that drove the adoption of determinate sentencing
guidelines in adult court.16 Children are subjected to sentences
created with mature adult offenders in mind.17 Children standing
trial as adults receive sentences that are therefore ipso facto
disproportionate. The failure to consider the adult court
disposition during the procedure represents a tacit recognition
that the consideration of age in sentencing is properly the province
of the court in which the child is sentenced. 18
Using Minnesota as a case study, this Article argues that the
legislature should require the adult court to consider age as a
mitigating factor at sentencing. Part I will situate Mitchell by
first examining the principles underlying Minnesota sentencing
16. See Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12
LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1993) (summarizing criticisms of The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines and arguing that the determinate system should be retained as it
provides for "rational and effective sentencing"). In fact, the subject of this Article
is moot in some states because they possess statutory schemes that do allow for age
considerations in sentencing children in adult court. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS:
RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 239-40, 316-18 (1999)
(noting, as examples, the statutes of Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Utah). Indeed, one state, Nevada, has gone even further as the state's supreme
court declared that a life sentence imposed on a 14-year-old amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment under the state constitution and was thus forbidden in the
state. See Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989). However, it is still the
case that "most states have no explicit policy stipulating youth as a mitigating
factor" in sentencing. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in
American Juvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 267, 279 (1991). In fact, California is currently considering
changing its waiver policy in a way that will bring many more chronological youths
into the state's adult criminal system and thus increase the import of a rational
sentencing policy for juveniles prosecuted in adult court. See Evelyn Nieves,
California Proposal Toughens Penalties for Young Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, March 6,
2000, at Al. Although not an empirically reliable indicator of the level of national
discussion, it is at least noteworthy that The New Yorker Magazine recently
carried a cartoon in which one woman says to another about her child, "He's in that
awkward age when he can be tried as an adult." THE NEW YORKER, March 6, 2000,
at 32.
17. The juvenile court has a complete range of statutorily created sentencing
options. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.193, .198 (2000) (setting out the available
dispositions for juvenile offenders).
18. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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policy as expressed in the state's Sentencing Guidelines. 19 Part I
will next inquire into the process of transferring children to adult
court in Minnesota. 20 Part I will further contextualize the decision
by outlining the role that proportionality considerations play in
criminal sentencing, as explicated in the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.2 ' Finally, Part I will offer a brief
account of how the Supreme Court has assessed the fundamental
rights of children in order to provide a potentially different
framework for thinking about kids and sentencing. 22 Part II will
detail the court's decision in Mitchell.2 3 Finally, Part III will argue
that the Minnesota legislature should heed the state court's
clarion call to alter the Sentencing Guidelines and require judges
to consider age as a mitigating factor for children who have been
processed to adult court. 24
I. Background
A. Sentencing Policy in Minnesota
Any discussion of sentencing in Minnesota must be placed in
the context of the state's Sentencing Guidelines. 25 Minnesota was
one of the first of a growing number of states to adopt guidelines
based on determinate sentencing principles. 26 In an attempt to
create a rational sentencing policy, the Minnesota legislature
empowered the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to
formulate a sentencing regime.27 Although it is hard to attribute
legislative purpose to guidelines that were passed by the
19. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 107-134 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 135-174 and accompanying text.
25. See MINN. STAT. § 244 apps. I-V (2000).
26. See Kimberly K Hall, Criminal Law-Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines:
Plea Agreements Are Not Sufficient Justification for Departure, 23 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 189, 192 (1997) (stating "Minnesota pioneered the determinative
sentencing system").
27. See Richard S. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, the Sentencing
Commission, and Other Officials Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346-47 (1993) [hereinafter Frase, The Role of the
Legislature]. Professor Richard S. Frase has written ably and extensively on the
purposes underlying the adoption of the Minnesota guideline system. See Richard
S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363, 431 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) [hereinafter Frase,
Theory and Practice] (containing bibliographic references to Professor Frase's work
on the Minnesota guidelines).
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Sentencing Guidelines Commission, as Professor Frase has noted,
"subsequent legislation, appellate case law, and trial court
departure practices" can provide some insight into the more
general purposive goals of the legislature. 28 Professor Frase finds
the guidelines to be in line with a "limiting retributivist" approach
to punishment "guided by a general principle of restraint and
economy that [Norval] Morris labels 'parsimony."'29 Frase finds
increasing rates of departure from the guidelines, with "mitigating
departures far outweighing aggravating departures in all years" as
evidence of parsimonial and limiting retributivist presence in the
guidelines. 30
The guidelines do permit sentencing judges to depart from
presumptive sentences in light of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. 31 The case law establishes that although the list of
mitigating factors set out in the guidelines is not exclusive, in
order to be relevant in considering a downward departure from the
presumptive sentence, the factor must "tend to excuse or mitigate
the offender's culpability for the offense." 32 Minnesota courts will
consider numerous factors for a downward departure, "including
the defendant's age."33
The Sentencing Guidelines, however, set first degree murder
aside from offenses for which mitigating factors, including age, can
be considered. 34 This fact, however, should not completely remove
first degree murder from the larger determinative purposes of the
guidelines. 35 The same considerations of parsimony and limiting
retributivism that apply to presumptive sentences should also
apply to the mandatory sentence for first degree murder. 36
The Minnesota legislature has approved a guideline system
aimed at achieving a rational sentencing policy, a component of
28. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, supra note 27, at 347.
29. See id. at 354. For more on the nature of "limiting retributivism" as a
punitive philosophy, see NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974);
Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING:
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 180 (Andrew VonHirsch & Andrew Ashworth
eds., 1998). For more on the theory of parsimony, see Michael Tonry,
Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangability of Punishments, in PENAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE 59-84 (1994).
30. Frase, Theory and Practice, supra note 27, at 404-06.
31. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(D) (1999).
32. State v. Esparza, 367 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also
State v. Staten, 390 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
33. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
34. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(E) (1999).
35. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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which is the exclusion of first degree murder from the range of
offenses for which judges may consider mitigating factors. 37 If this
exclusion is to be considered "rational" for youths sentenced in
adult court, it must be because there exists a separate procedural
device that ensures consideration of adult court sentences before
those children appear in adult court. An examination of the
Mvinnesota certification system, however, demonstrates that this is
not in fact the case.38
B. Juvenile Waiver
Juvenile courts were established nationwide in the first part
of the twentieth century.39 These courts conceived of juvenile
offenders as troubled youths and sought to address the children's
"real needs" of rehabilitation.40 At their inception, most juvenile
courts had procedures for waiving jurisdiction over serious
offenders. 41 In the 1980s, in response to the perception of an
explosion of juvenile crime, many states revised their procedures
for waiving juvenile jurisdiction and certifying children to stand
trial in adult court.42 The newer statutes abandoned the full
rehabilitative approach to juvenile crime and expressly espoused a
more retributive approach to serious offenders, with the aims of
protecting the public from dangerous youths and administering
deserved punishment. 43 Minnesota amended its juvenile waiver
statutes in line with these retributive goals. 44
37. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(E) (1999).
38. See infra notes 39-64.
39. The history of the formation of juvenile courts is an oft told tale. See
ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137-63
(1977); Janet A. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N. CAR. L. REV. 1083 (1991);
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules for Procedure for Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142-64 (1984); Francis Barry McCarthy, supra note
11, at 640-46. For a contemporaneous account of the early juvenile courts, see
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
40. See generally PLATT, supra note 39 (explaining the formation of juvenile
courts).
41. See Eric K Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the
Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 371,
377 (1997); McCarthy, supra note 11, at 644.
42. See FELD, supra note 16, at 189-244; Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to
Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS L. REV. 277, 281-286; Klein, supra note 41, at 377-382.
43. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 81 (1988).
44. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2000); see also Paula R. Brummel, Doing
Adult Time for Juvenile Crime: When the Charge, Not the Conviction Spells Prison
for Kids, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 541, 546-54 (1996); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court
[Vol. 18:323
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The Minnesota statutes set out the process for referring a
child to adult court. 45 The statutes construct two categories of
juvenile offenders: those who are presumptively waivable and
those who are not.46 Children are presumptively waivable in two
circumstances. First, children aged sixteen or seventeen years old
are presumed to be subject to adult court jurisdiction if they are
accused of a crime that carries a statutory presumption of jail time
or involved a firearm. 47 Second, a child will be subject to the
presumption of waivablility if the child has previously been
prosecuted for a felony pursuant to the waiver statutes and found
guilty of the charged offense. 48 A child can rebut the presumption
of certification by a showing of "clear and convincing evidence"
that public safety would not be threatened by his remaining in the
juvenile system, and that he is amenable to treatment. 49
Any child not subject to presumptive certification who has
reached the age of fourteen and is accused of a felony still may face
the possibility of being prosecuted in adult court.50 The court will
consider six public safety factors when presented with a petition
for certification: the seriousness of the alleged offense, the
culpability of the child, the child's prior record, the child's history
of treatment, the adequacy of programs available and the possible
dispositions available in the juvenile sentencing regime.51 The
burden on the prosecuting authority to sustain a waiver ruling,
according to the plain words of the statute, requires no
consideration of the length of the sentence the child may face in
adult court.52 In addition, the statute provides that a court should
accord more weight to the seriousness of the offense and the child's
Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender, Dismantling the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981) (examining these legislative changes and their
connection to retributive penalogical aims); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry
C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Juvenile Waiver, 86 J. CRIM.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1996) (examining 330 transfers in Minnesota from 1986-
1992).
45. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2000).
46. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(2)-.125(3) (2000).
47. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(3)(2) (2000). The firearm provision includes
"brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employing a firearm." Id.
48. See MINN. STAT. § 260B. 125(5) (2000). The child does not have to have been
found guilty of the original charge; he will qualify for the presumption even if he
was found guilty of a "lesser-included offense" in the original proceeding, but this
lesser-included offense must have been a felony. Id.
49. See MINN. STAT. § 260B. 125(3) (2000).
50. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(1) (2000).




prior record than to other factors.53
The exact contours of waiver decisions, as set out in the case
law, demonstrate that the treatment the waived child will receive
in adult court is a minimal factor in the certification process. 54
The trial court has wide discretion to decide the waiver issue, as
appellate courts apply the "clearly erroneous" standard when
reviewing waiver decisions.5 5 The decision-making process in the
trial court thus becomes all the more important because of the
lessened likelihood that waiver decisions will be overturned.
Legislation and case law demonstrate two significant
developments in waiver decision making. First, the Minnesota
legislature amended the waiver statute in 1996 to promote public
safety objectives. 56 Since then, courts have increasingly based
assessments of a child's dangerousness solely on the offense at
issue. 57 Previous to the amendment, courts considered a child's
dangerousness not in isolation with the offense at issue, but rather
required non-offense related evidence of dangerousness.5 8 The
amendment effectively ended such analysis; juveniles, even in non-
presumptive cases, are increasingly waived based almost entirely
on the offense they committed. 59
Second, the case law reveals the lack of consideration that
courts give to the adult sentence looming in the child's adult court
future. 60 The Minnesota statute only requires that courts look to
53. See id. That all non-presumptive waivers are subject to judicial discretion
ostensibly lessens the potential for injustice in this inequitably balanced weighing
process. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(2) (2000) ("Except as provided.., the juvenile
court may order a certification.") (emphasis added).
54. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that a trial court's decision will not be reversed unless "clearly erroneous so
as to constitute an abuse of discretion.") (quoting In the Welfare of T.L.J., 495
N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 745 (noting that non-offense related evidence of dangerousness is
not required by the statute).
58. See In re Welfare of KA.P., 550 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that "[u]nder earlier versions of the certification statute, it has been held that the
state must present evidence of dangerousness other than the offense charged in the
petition itself.") (citing In re Welfare of KP.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Minn. 1980)).
59. This trend has not been without its critics. See D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 746
(Davies, J., dissenting) (objecting to the finding of waiver because "[e]ven in cases
in which a juvenile is charged with the most heinous offense, reference cannot be
based solely on the juvenile's age and the seriousness of the crime").
60. The only case where the adult sentence was considered is the tremendously
truncated discussion in K.A.P., 550 N.W.2d at 12. The court mentioned that the
trial court "compared the presumptive adult criminal sentence (306 months) to the
time remaining in the juvenile system," but also stated that the trial court
determined that the time remaining "did not provide an adequate period of
[Vol. 18:323
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the available dispositions in the juvenile system, 61 and the case
law is full of decisions certifying children to adult court based
wholly on findings that the time remaining for juvenile court
jurisdiction was adjudged insufficient. 62 The case law, however, is
practically devoid of discussions of the dispositions "available" in
adult court.63 A child sentenced for murder in juvenile court faces
as much as five or six years.64 In adult court, this sentence is
enlarged to at least thirty years. Courts that waive children give
short shrift to the extremity of the disproportion between these
two sentences.
C. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
In 1910, the Supreme Court stated that "it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense." 65  The Eighth Amendment, which
provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted"
codifies this precept in American law. 66 In Weems v. U.S.,67 the
supervision." Id. Thus even when a juvenile court does consider the looming
sentence, it appears that it takes a back seat to considerations of the available
juvenile dispositions.
61. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125(4) (2000).
62. See, e.g., D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 745 (stating that a "prosecutor only needed
to show that retaining the juvenile in the juvenile system did not serve public
safety" goals); In re Welfare of J.S.J., 550 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding waiver where "the juvenile system [was] not equipped to work with the
child"); In re Welfare of S.J.G., 547 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding waiver where the court found the child was "unlikely to succeed in
treatment."); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding waiver where ability of juvenile system to deal with child was limited
because of "long history of violent, gang-related activity"); In re Welfare of M.J.B.,
509 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding waiver where the "time
remaining before M.J.B.'s 19th birthday was insufficient for treatment within the
juvenile system.").
63. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
64. Although normally the jurisdiction of the juvenile court would terminate
upon the offender's 19th birthday, MINN. STAT. § 260B. 193(5) (2000), the Extended
Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution statute creates the possibility of remaining in the
juvenile system until the age of 21. See id. at 260B.193(5)(b).
65. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
67. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). At issue in Weems was a disbursing officer's sentence
of 15 years to "cadena" for falsifying a cash book for the port of Manila in the
Philippines. See id. at 357. Cadena is defined as "an afflictive penalty consisting of
imprisonment at 'hard and laborious work,' originally with a chain hanging from
the waist to the ankle and carrying with it the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualification from office, and, in the case of
'cadena temporal,' surveillance by the authorities during life." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 203 (6th ed.) (1990). Weems was sentenced to "cadena temporal." See
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Court established that the Constitution requires proportionality in
sentencing.68 The Eighth Amendment has thus served as a
constitutional basis for challenges to excessively harsh prison
sentences. 69
After Weems, the Supreme Court did not re-consider the
proportionality principle in connection with prison sentence
duration for six decades, until its decision in Rummel v. Estelle.
70
Weems, 217 U.S. at 358.
68. Proportionality is the proposition that a punishment should not exceed the
guilt incurred by the commission of a particular crime, gauged by the heinousness
of the crime and the culpability of the offender. See Chris Baniszewski, Suprente
Court Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment's
Proportionality Requirement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 929, 942 (1993).
69. See infra notes 70-97 and accompanying text. Eighth Amendment
considerations arise in three settings: challenges to the death penalty, to the
treatment of prisoners and to the length of prison sentences. On a number of
occasions the Court has expounded upon the Eighth Amendment when the death
penalty is involved. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 622 (1977) (holding
that a sentence of death imposed for the crime of rape was grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment forbidden by the Eighth amendment); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (holding that under the circumstances punishment of
death for the crime of murder did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments and noting that retribution and possible deterrence to capital crimes
could be taken into consideration to determine if the death penalty should be used);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that death is uniquely and
unusually severe punishment and states may no longer inflict it for punishment of
crimes). For discussion concerning the death penalty and juveniles, see Seung Oh
Kang, The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance: Preservation of the
Capital Defendant's Constitutional Rights Pursuant to Traditional Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 764-77 (1994) (arguing
against maintaining the line of 16 years old as a death penalty cut-off age and
supporting the application of a consistent "rights of man" analysis); Dominic J.
Ricotta, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty for Juveniles A State's Right or a
Child's Injustice? Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988), 79 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 921 (1988). Decisions dealing with the treatment of prisoners also
invoke Eighth Amendment analysis. See Jonathan A. Vold, The Eighth
Amendment "Punishment" Clause After Helling v. McKinney: Four Terms, Two
Standards, and A Search for Definition, 44 DEPAUL L REV. 215 (1994) (examining
the Court's conception of the term "punishment," but also giving summary of the
Court's application of the Eighth Amendment in the prison context). Finally, the
Court considers the Eighth Amendment when an individual challenges the length
of a prison sentence. See infra notes 70-97 and accompanying text. Although all of
these situations involve the Eighth Amendment, the actual application of the
Eighth Amendment differs depending on the particular issue involved. For this
reason, this Article focuses solely upon the Court's decisions involving the duration
of prison sentences.
70. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). At issue was a Texas recidivist statute under which
William Rummel had been sentenced to life in prison. See id. at 266. Rummel was
found guilty of obtaining less than $150 by false pretenses, but because the offense
was his third felony conviction, he received a mandatory life sentence. See id. at
265-66. Rummel challenged "the State's authority to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment, as opposed to a substantial term of years." Id. at 270-71. The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld Rummel's sentence. See id. at 285.
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The Court asserted that there is little room for proportionality
review in noncapital cases by stating that "one could argue
without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for
crimes.., punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a
state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative."7 1  The Court
characterized its precedent as providing relief from only "grossly
disproportionate" punishments.
7 2
The dedication to deferring to legislative determinations
regarding prison sentences was seriously called into question three
years later in Solem v. Helm.73 In Solem, the Court overturned the
imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole for
the cashing of a $100 check for which the defendant did not have
an account.74 Justice Powell's majority opinion insisted that
proportionality has a place in judicial review of noncapital
sentences. 75 Justice Powell set out the "objective factors" that a
71. Id. at 274. The Court showed concern that a court could base Eighth
Amendment decisions "merely on the subjective views of individual justices." Id. at
274. The Court was uncomfortable with judicial efforts at line drawing between
differing terms of imprisonment and thus declared that the state "is entitled to
make its own judgment as to where such lines lie." Id. at 284. Rummel attempted
to provide "objective" factors to the Court to aid in the analysis, but the Court was
unpersuaded that his methods were indeed helpful. See id. at 277-81. Rummel
argued that the Court could consider how other similar crimes within the
particular jurisdiction were graded. See id. at 275-76. He also suggested a
comparison to sentences imposed in other jurisdictions. See id. at 277-80. In
rejecting these criteria as not providing enough of an "objective" standard, the
Court noted the discretion incumbent in prosecutorial charging decisions as well as
state courts' discretion to admit evidence of past crimes at sentencing hearings as
proof that the whole range of sentencing procedure was dominated by subjective
decisions that would create prohibitive complexities for the type of review Rummel
suggested. See id. at 281.
72. See id. at 271.
73. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
74. See id. at 281. Because Helm had been convicted of several previous
crimes, he was sentenced under the South Dakota recidivist statute. See id. The
Court of Appeals held that Helm's sentence was distinguishable from the one
upheld in Rummel because Helm had no possibility of parole and a survey of
penalties for similar crimes in other states showed that Helm's sentence was much
greater than he would have received anywhere else. See id. at 297. The Supreme
Court affirmed this determination. See id. at 303.
75. See id. at 284-86. Powell supported the position that "as a matter of
principle.., a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the
defendant has been convicted" with an inquiry into the history of the adoption of
the Eighth Amendment into the Bill of Rights. See id. at 290. Powell also found
that the "principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for
almost a century." Id. at 286. Responding to the contention that proportionality is
only applicable to capital sentences, Powell stated that there is no basis for such an
assertion because the "constitutional language itself suggests no exception for
imprisonment' and it would be "anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a
fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proportionality
333
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court should apply when assessing the constitutionality of a
sentence and asserted that a court must consider "(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions."76  Powell recognized that application of the first
component of the test "assumes that courts are competent to judge
the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale," but asserted
that this assumption was justified because courts have
traditionally done so, citing principled distinctions made upon the
"absolute magnitude" of crimes, differences based upon attempted
versus completed crimes as well as distinctions based on the
culpability of an offender. 77 Applying this analytical framework,
the Court found Helm's sentence "significantly disproportionate to
his crime, and.. .therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment."78
The Solem dissent asserted that "today's holding cannot
rationally be reconciled with Rummel."79 The dissent recognized
that in some cases the Court had applied a proportionality
analysis but argued that "proportionality review has been carried
out only in a very limited category of cases, and never before in a
case involving solely a sentence of imprisonment."80  Very little
ground for agreement existed as the dissent felt that the Court
had "launche[d] into unchartered and unchartable waters" by
introducing the specter of judicial subjectivity into sentencing.8 1
This dissent highlights the principles that underlie opposition to
analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not." Id. at 288-
89.
76. Id. at 292.
77. See id. at 292-93. Powell also stated that this list of established principles
was "by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates that there are generally
accepted criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale."
Id. at 294.
78. Id. at 303.
79. Id. at 304 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did not think that Solent
was inconsistent with Rummel because Hutto v. Davis:
[made] clear that Runintel should not be read to foreclose proportionality
review of sentences of imprisonment. Runntel did reject a proportionality
challenge to a particular sentence. But since the Rummel Court-like the
dissent today-offered no standards for determining when an Eighth
Amendment violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar
factual situation. Here the facts are clearly distinguishable.
Id. at 304 n.32. Hutto involved a 40 year sentence imposed for marijuana
possession. See Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). The Court upheld the
sentence. Id.
80. Id. at 306 (Burger, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 314 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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considering age as a mitigating factor and also sets the stage for
the wide disparity of opinions offered by the Court in Harmelin v.
Michigan.8 2
Harmelin is the latest Supreme Court case to address
proportionality and noncapital sentences.8 3  The five justice
majority agreed only on two very narrow propositions: mandatory
penalties do not violate the Eighth Amendment,8 4 and the
"individualized capital sentencing doctrine"8 5 is not applicable to
noncapital sentences.8 6 On the issue of proportionality, however,
the Court produced three disparate opinions.
8 7
Justice Scalia's opinion asserted that the Constitution
contains no proportionality requirement at all.88  Scalia first
82. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
83. See id at 961. Ronald Allen Harmelin was convicted of possession of 672
grams of cocaine. See id. His conviction was reversed on state constitutional illegal
seizure grounds but this decision was vacated on rehearing where the Court of
Appeals rejected Harmelin's argument that his life sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. See id. Although Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the 5-4
Court, his opinion was joined in full only by Chief Justice Rhenquist. See id. For
commentary on the Harmelin decision, see JoAnne Aylward Pierce, Constitutional
Law-Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis of Ternis for Years Uncertain-
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991), 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 210 (1992);
Pamela L. Bailey, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is the Eighth Amendment's
Proportionality Guarantee Left an Empty Shell?, 24 PAC. L.J. 221 (1992); Kathi A.
Drew & R. K. Weaver, Disproportionate or Excessive Punishments: Is There a
Method for Successful Constitutional Challenges?, 2 TEX. WESLYAN L. REV. 1
(1995);
84. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994.
85. See id. at 994-96. Harmelin argued that the mandatory life sentence could
only be the harshest of a series of penalties available to a sentencing court, imposed
only after a determination that such a sentence would not be grossly
disproportionate to the particular crime and defendant. See id. This procedure
constitutes the "individualized capital sentencing doctrine." Id. at 995 (citing
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73 (1987)). The Court declined to apply this
doctrine to noncapital sentences, stating that "if petitioner's sentence forecloses
some 'flexible techniques' for later reducing his sentence, it does not foreclose all of
them, since there remain the possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction and
executive clemency." Id. at 996 (internal citations omitted).
86. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96.
87. See id. Justice Marshall filed a fourth opinion but his separate dissent
offered no idiosyncratic analysis on proportionality, agreeing with Justice White's
dissent on the issue. See id. at 1027-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (filing separately
in order to distinguish his views on the death penalty from Justice White's).
88. See id. at 965. Scalia delved into the history of the Punishments Clause
and concluded that "it is most unlikely" that the English common law tradition
included proportionality guarantees. Id. at 974. There is considerable debate about
the historical existence of proportionality protections. See Banieszewski, supra
note 68, at 930-936 (1993) (noting that "whether the English Declaration of Rights
contained a proportionality principle is subject to considerable debate"). Scalia also
found the history of the Eighth Amendment's adoption and early judicial
construction of the Clause persuasive evidence that it was not meant to include
proportionality considerations. The intent of the framers is, like the contents of the
2000]
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launched into a scathing critique of the Court's decision in Solem,
contending that the decision ignored precedent and "was simply
wrong."89 Scalia warned that application of proportionality would
reduce Eighth Amendment protections to the subjective values of
individual judges.90 Realizing that the Court "has not remained
entirely in accord with the proposition that there is no
proportionality requirement" in the Constitution, he rested by
claiming that proportionality review is only applicable in death
sentence cases. 9 1
Justice Kennedy's concurrence dismissed Scalia's extreme
position, recognized a "narrow proportionality principle," and
framed his opinion around how to perform such review.9 2 Justice
Kennedy interpreted Solem as requiring a "threshold comparison
of the crime committed and the sentence imposed."93  If the
threshold is met, only then should a court engage in inter- and
intra-jurisdictional analysis.9 4 The remaining Justices found "no
justification for overruling or limiting Solem" and that the Court
should have, therefore, simply applied the three factor test set out
in that decision.95
English Declaration of Rights, a matter of disagreement. See id. at 936-40;
Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the framers did intend to
include proportionality guarantees); Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment
Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980) (arguing that the adoption of the Bill of Rights was not
intended to include proportionality guarantees).
89. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965.
90. See id. at 986-90.
91. Id. at 990-94.
92. See id. at 997-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy put forth five "common
principles that give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review" in
order to argue that Harmelin's punishment is "within the constitutional boundaries
established by our prior decisions." Id. at 998, 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
Kennedy's five principles are: (i) setting prison terms is a penalogical judgment
that is the province of the legislature; (ii) the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
the adoption of a particular penalogical theory; (iii) different penalogical theories
will affect the types of sentences a system imposes; (iv) proportionality review must
be done with objective factors; and (v) the Eighth Amendment prohibits only
punishments that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime for which they are
imposed. See id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Kennedy compared the crime at issue in Harmelin with the crime
committed in Solem and found that possession of 672 grams of cocaine was "far
more grave" than the non-violent, minor crimes at issue in Solem. Id. at 1001-05
(Kennedy, J., concurring.). Because the "threshold" was not met, Kennedy found no
reason to subject Harmelin's sentence to any type of comparative analysis. See id.
95. Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). The remaining Justices objected to
Kennedy's position which essentially argued "that Solem's analysis should be
reduced from three factors to one." Id. at 1009. Justice Marshall filed a separate
[VCol. 18:323
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This survey of Supreme Court Eighth Amendment decisions
demonstrates several established principles about the scope of
proportionality review in noncapital cases. The determination of
sentences is largely reserved to legislative discretion. 96 At least
seven justices agree, however, that the Constitution requires some
level of proportionality between crime and sentence, between
culpability and punishment. 97 Legislatures should be vigilant in
maintaining this correlation for all offenders, especially juvenile
offenders.
D. Kids and Fundamental Rights
Proportionality is not, however, the only area of law that can
impact a consideration of youth as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. The general framework of children and fundamental
rights provides a mode for thinking about the legal import of
youth.98 The Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution
does not afford co-extensive fundamental rights to children and
adults.99 The Court has required some, but not all, of the same
procedural safeguards in juvenile court as in adult court;10 0
dissent but explicitly asserted his agreement with the majority of Justice White's
opinion. See id. at 1027-29. Justice Stevens agreed "wholeheartedly with Justice
White's dissenting opinion," but filed separately to emphasize that because a life
sentence "does not even purport to serve a rehabilitative function," the crime
committed must be so atrocious as to create in society an interest in retribution and
incapacitation that outweighs its interest in rehabilitation. Id. at 1028 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Stevens asserted that it is hard to argue that all offenders guilty of
possession of large amounts of cocaine are beyond rehabilitation. See id. at 1029.
96. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
97. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.
98. The issue of fundamental rights and children has come up most recently in
connection with curfew laws. See Gregory Z. Chen, Youth Curfews and the Trilogy
of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131 (1997); Brian J. Lester,
Is It Too Late for Juvenile Curfews: QUTB and the Constitution, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 665 (1996); Brian Privor, Dusk 'til Dawn: Children's Rights and the
Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415 (1999); Note,
Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the
Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163 (1984).
99. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (noting that although the Court
has applied certain constitutional rights with equal force to adults and children,
"the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment
of juveniles"); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (finding that precedent
demonstrates the "conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults"); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
(holding that the requirement of a jury trial does not apply to proceedings in
juvenile court).
100. For cases where the Court has found co-extensive constitutional rights, see
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the "essentials of due process," such as
notice of charges, apply in juvenile court); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applicable to juvenile court
337
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decided whether schools are permitted to restrict students' free
speech;101 and found the limits of the need for parental consent in
children's lives. 102  The Supreme Court has identified three
reasons for limiting minors' constitutional rights. 103 First, courts
will be prone to limit children's rights if the activity at issue
involves the "peculiar vulnerability" of children. 10 4 Second, the
Court found that the inability of children to make informed
mature decisions justifies limits on the fundamental rights of
children. 05  Finally, the Court recognizes that the unique
relationship between parents and their children may place some
restrictions on a child's exercise of her fundamental rights. 106
These considerations must be heeded when dealing with children
in a legal setting; only then can society properly construct and
adhere to a rational policy for dealing with serious juvenile
offenders.
II. Minnesota Sentences a Child
The need for age to be considered as a mitigating factor at
sentencing for children waived to adult court on first degree
murder charges is demonstrated by the case of Eric Mitchell. On
November 17, 1994, fifteen-year-old Eric Mitchell hung out at a
new friend's house with some other high school students in
proceedings). For cases where the Court has found constitutional rights to not be
co-extensive, see Schall, 467 U.S. at 253 (holding that constitutional limits to
pretrial detention are different for adults and children); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528
(holding that there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile court).
101. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
free speech guarantees apply in the school setting).
102. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (holding parental notification/judicial
approval requirement of abortion statute impermissibly burdened a minor's right to
abortion).
103. See id. at 634. The three reasons are (1) the particular vulnerability of
children, (2) minors' "inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner," and (3) the role of parents in rearing their children. Id. The last of these
reasons, the parental role, does not add to the argument for proportionality in
sentencing. The Court recognizes the significance of the parent in the child's life
because parent's "have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare" the child for socially responsible participation in society. Id. at 637
(quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). Although it is
possible that a waived child's parents would continue to be a presence in the child's
life during and after incarceration, they cannot claim to have lived up to the "high
duty" envisioned by the Court. The lack of applicability of this factor should not,
however, weigh against applying proportionality analysis to children sentenced in
adult court as the lack of parental guidance does not make the child less vulnerable
or better able to make mature, informed decisions.
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Hutchinson, Minnesota. 10 7 Early in the evening, Mitchell went
into a back room of the apartment with two of the people there,
one seventeen years old and the other twenty years old.108 While
in the back room, the twenty-year-old stated that he needed
money, pulled out a .22 caliber pistol and asked the two juveniles
if they knew anyone who would want to buy the gun.109 They
could not think of a buyer so the three decided that the two minors
should take the twenty-year-old's car and gun and rob a
convenience store. 10 Mitchell and his seventeen-year-old friend
drove to George's Food and Fuel."' Once there, the two juveniles
entered and exited the store twice before Mitchell finally entered
the store at 9:37 p.m. and confronted the cashier with the pistol.112
The surveillance videotape showed that the cashier offered no
resistance to the robbery, but within twelve seconds of Mitchell's
entrance into the store, the clerk was shot in the face." 3 Mitchell
then went behind the counter and kicked the wounded clerk. 114
Police and medical personnel arrived on the scene soon after, and
although attempts were made to revive the clerk, he died at the
hospital at 10:30 p.m." 5
The McCleod County Attorney filed first degree murder
charges against Mitchell in juvenile court." 6 The County Attorney
also requested that the juvenile court refer the case to adult
court.1 7 After psychological evaluations and hearings, the court
signed an order giving adult court jurisdiction over Eric
Mitchell." 8 The Court of Appeals upheld the order.1 19
After a jury trial in adult court, Eric Mitchell was found
guilty of one count of first degree murder, one count of second
degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. 120 Although
107. See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1998).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 483-84.






116. See id. During the robbery, Mitchell's wallet fell on the floor of the
convenience store. See id. The police found Mitchell's wallet, obtained a
description of the car that Mitchell and his friend had been driving, found the boys




120. See id. at 486. During the trial, defense counsel requested several jury
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conviction of first degree murder in adult court carries a
presumptive life sentence with a minimum of thirty years served
in prison, the trial court nevertheless granted defense counsel's
request for a sentencing hearing.121 At the sentencing hearing, a
psychiatrist testified regarding Mitchell's emotional and
psychological trouble. 122 Although the judge at the sentencing
hearing stated that imposing the statutory penalty in this case
was one of his "darkest days," the sentencing court found that age
was the only possible mitigating factor, and that age could not be
used as a mitigating factor in a first degree murder case. 123 On
appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Mitchell argued, inter
alia, that the sentence as applied to a child constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and violated his right to substantive due
process 124 and equal protection, 125 and that the district court erred
by concluding that it did not have the inherent power to consider
his age at sentencing. 126
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's claim of
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 27 Focusing on the
proportionality of the punishment, the court stated that "Mitchell
committed one of the most heinous crimes... [t]herefore we cannot
say that his punishment was out of proportion to his crime."'128
The court looked to recent legislative activity in connection with
juvenile dispositions and concluded that a 1994 change in the
certification statute shifted the emphasis "from treatment options
instructions that were denied. See id. These instructions were not part of the
sentencing hearing but did form part of the appeal considered by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. See id. at 485, 493-94. The court rejected the challenge to the
instructions, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
instruct the jury as to circumstantial evidence, the facts of a particular defense
theory and intent. See id. at 493-94.
121. See id. at 486.
122. See id. at 486-87. The pre-sentence psychological report compiled by the
Department of Corrections disclosed Mitchell's several suicide attempts, his having
been kicked out of his physically abusive mother's house and his reports of hearing
voices since the death of the convenience store clerk. See id.
123. See id. at 488.
124. See id. at 490-91. Mitchell argued that his substantive due process was
violated both because the legislature could not have a rational basis for extreme
differences in adult and juvenile sentences and because the sentencing court was
statutorily unable to consider his age as a mitigating factor. See id.
125. See id. at 492-93. Mitchell argued that the grave disparity between his
sentence and a sentence imposed on a 15-year-old retained in the juvenile system
violated his right to equal protection. See id.
126. See id. at 488.
127. See id at 490.
128. Id. at 489.
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to public safety."129 This shift provided evidence that Mitchell's
sentence reflected "evolving standards of decency" in the
community and therefore could not be deemed unconstitutionally
cruel. 130 The court also looked to other jurisdictions in order to
conclude that the sentence was not unusual.13'
Ultimately, the court found that none of Mitchell's
constitutional rights had been violated.132 In the process, however,
the court expressed its discomfort with this holding. 3 3 The court
twice noted that it "would prefer" that the legislature provide some
type of intermediate sentencing alternative that could be applied
to children in Mitchell's situation.134
129. Id. See supra note 43-44 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 490.
131. See id. The court cited a recent Ninth Circuit decision that surveyed
juvenile sentencing in adult courts around the country. See id. (citing Harris v.
Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996) which held that there is no consensus among
states on whether sentencing a 15-year-old to life imprisonment is cruel and
unusual punishment; thus such a sentence does not offend nationwide standards).
In that case, defendant could cite to only two states that required adult courts to
consider a juvenile's age in sentencing, while 26 states sentenced no person to
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole and 21 states subjected
15-year-olds to such punishments. See id.
132. The court declared that "there is no fundamental right to have age
considered in adult sentencing" and thus only inquired as to whether the
legislature had a rational basis to permit sentencing a 15-year-old to life in prison.
See id. Minnesota has ruled that automatic certification of a 16-year-old to adult
court and mandatory life sentences for murder does not violate substantive due
process. See id. (citing State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 568 (Minn. 1997) that held
that certification of 16-year-old to adult court without a hearing did not violate
substantive due process rights); State v. Walker, 235 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Minn.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976) (holding that mandatory life sentence does
not violate substantive due process rights even though court was not empowered to
consider mitigating factors). The court analogized these decisions to Mitchell's
claims to similarly find no substantive due process violation. See id. The court
quickly disposed of Mitchell's other constitutional claims, finding that procedural
due process protects only the "opportunity to be heard" and that Mitchell was
afforded this right in his certification hearing. See id. at 492. The court also found
that the sentence did not violate Mitchell's equal protection rights because the
certification process determined that he was not 'similarly situated to [other] 15-
year-olds who remain in the juvenile system." Id. at 493. Finally, the Court found
Mitchell's argument that the trial court has inherent authority to depart from
statutory sentences unpersuasive. See id. Minnesota allows such deviation only in
cases of "selective or discriminatory prosecutorial intent." Id. (citing State v.
Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn. 1996)). There was no allegation of such
intent here and thus departure from the guidelines was not in the power of the trial
court. See id.
133. See id. at 491 ('[W]e are sympathetic to the concern expressed by the
district court judge who sentenced Mitchell when he stated that there should have
been a 'middle ground' [upon which to sentence Mitchell]").
134. Id. at 491 "[We would prefer that the legislature provide the courts with
the option to treat children differently than adults." Id. The Court also stated, "we
would prefer that the legislature had provided a sentencing alternative... for
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III. Analysis
The Mitchell court handed down a decision with which it
showed discomfort. 135 The Minnesota legislature, however, could
remedy the problems raised by the Mitchell decision with a statute
that requires courts to consider age as a mitigating factor at
sentencing of waived children in adult court. The remainder of
this Article will argue that the legislature should provide this
alternative.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court has recognized that proportionality in sentencing is required
by the Eighth Amendment.136 Two aspects of the proportionality
jurisprudence bear import for the sentencing of children in adult
court. First, the emphasis in these cases has been on the great
range of legislative determination of proper punishment for
crime. 137 The Weems decision, even in delineating limits on
legislative choice, noted the importance of legislative power in the
area. 138 The later twentieth century cases have reinforced this
near absolute power of legislatures to fashion prison sentences. 139
Second, although the substantial majority of the Supreme Court
agrees that proportionality considerations enter into judicial
assessment of particular sentences, there is not similar agreement
about how to determine proportionality. 140
All agree that the gravity of the crime should be considered,
but disagree as to whether the seriousness of the crime should be a
"threshold" issue or merely a component in a three-part analysis
that also looks to inter- and intra-jurisdictional sentences. Critics
of the "threshold" element express concern about the inherent
subjectivity of such considerations.14 ' Although one may argue
that the introduction of individualized considerations would give
subjectivity a central place in proportionality review, it is such
individualized attention that is one of the hallmarks of the
juvenile system.142 Requiring judges to consider age in adult court
someone like Mitchell-someone still a child, yet certified to stand trial as an
adult." Id.
135. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
138. See Weems v. United States, 27 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (characterizing the
power of the legislature as "great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the
actions of men").
139. See supra notes 69-97 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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sentencing of youthful offenders is a sensible balance between the
desire to protect public safety and the recognition that simply
transferring a child to adult court does not automatically make the
youth an adult.
A. The Province of the Legislature
The legislature is the proper governmental body to affect the
requirement of youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 143 The
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment decisions beginning in the
1980s reflect expansive deference to legislative decisions. 144 In
fact, all of the justices in Harmelin appear to agree on the basic
premise that sentencing is largely a legislative concern. 145 Given
the disparity in the conceptions of how to apply proportionality
review, this agreement about the supremacy of the legislature
becomes the salient feature of the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Regarding determinations of applicable sentence
ranges for given offenses, "the Court effectively defers completely
to the legislature." 146
In fact, a strict application of the Court's proportionality
precedent points to the recognition that Mitchell's sentence is
constitutionally cognizable. Working with the threshold that
Justice Kennedy sought to establish in his Harmelin concurrence,
it seems doubtful that Mitchell's sentence would be found
143. See FELD, supra note 16, at 242 (stating that as a result of Harmelin,
"formulating a youth sentencing policy properly lies in the hands of legislators
rather than courts").
144. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (stating "one could
argue... [that] the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative").
145. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991). Scalia's opinion stated
that sentencing is "purely a matter of legislative prerogative." Id. (quoting
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274). Justice Kennedy admitted that "[t]he efficacy of any
sentencing system... [involves] fundamental choices and implementing them lies
with the legislature." Id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice White's dissent
submitted that proportionality review "affords 'substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits
of punishments for crimes."' Id. at 1016 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)).
146. Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting Legislative Discretion to Define Criminal
Elements and Sentencing Factors, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1999) (arguing for
a "criminal estoppel" test to determine the constitutionality of legislatively
mandated sentencing factors that increase the maximum penalty available for a
defendant). While recognizing that the power of the legislature in criminal matters
is great-indeed, the state possesses no power greater than the power to punish-
the Court has also emphasized the need to monitor this power, which can easily
become an instrument of tyranny, even if motivated by good intentions. See Weems
v. United States, 27 U.S. 349, 371-75 (1910).
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disproportionate. 147 Murder is one of the most serious crimes
defined by the Minnesota Statutes. 148 A life sentence without the
possibility of parole for the crime of possession of a large amount of
drugs was not "grossly disproportionate" under Kennedy's
threshold analysis.149 It is hard to imagine that a lesser sentence
for a more serious crime could meet such a threshold.
Solem, the only recent case that overturned a sentence as
disproportionate, involved a sentence of life without parole. 15
0
This difference served as a factual basis for distinguishing prior
cases.' 5 ' Mitchell will be eligible for parole after serving thirty
years in prison. 5 2 This fact alone distinguishes his sentence from
the one in Solem that the Court found unconstitutionally
disproportionate.1 53 The seriousness of the offense and the fact
that the possibility of parole exists makes it doubtful that
Mitchell's sentence would meet the threshold set out in Kennedy's
Harmelin concurrence.
Even if one accepts that Mitchell's sentence does meet the
threshold, a comparative analysis of intra- and inter-jurisdictional
sentences shows the sentence to be constitutionally permissible.
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines explicitly value ordinal
grading of punishments. 154 The Minnesota legislature has voiced
its opinion that first degree murder is a serious enough offense to
remove it from this graded system and impose a mandatory
sentence of life in prison.'5 5 Although life in prison is the most
serious punishment in the state, it is not a remote outlying point
on the penalogical scale.' 5 6 Rather, life in prison is merely the
greatest punishment for a crime of significant severity.
An inter-jurisdictional analysis likewise points to the
147. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997-1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(E) (1999) (setting first degree
murder apart for special treatment under the sentencing guidelines).
149. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301-03 (1983).
151. See id.; see also Bailey, supra note 83, at 244 (noting that the majority
opinion in Solem distinguished Solem from Rummel "based on the fact that there
was no possibility of parole (which had been available for the defendant in Rummel
but not for the defendant in [Solen]) to lessen the severity of the defendant's
sentence.").
152. See State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Minn. 1998).
153. See Solent, 463 U.S. at 303.
154. See Frase, supra note 16.
155. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II(E) (1999).
156. A person who is convicted of first degree murder as their first and only
offense would be eligible for supervised release after serving thirty years. See
MINN. STAT. § 244.05(4) (2000). Certain repeat offenders must serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole. See id.
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acceptability of Mitchell's sentence. Several states have upheld
challenges to life sentences for children found guilty of murder. 157
These challenges involved sentences where there was no
possibility of parole. Nevada is the only state that has found life
sentences without the possibility of parole for child murderers to
be unacceptable, but the state court reached this decision on state
constitutional grounds. 158  The law and practice of other
jurisdictions shows Mitchell's sentence to be in step with the
penalogical practices of the rest of the country and thus
constitutionally cognizable under this element of the Supreme
Court's proportionality analysis.
The Supreme Court's decisions demonstrate a continuing
wariness regarding the subjective nature of assessing the
proportionality of specific criminal sentences. 159 This wariness is
one of the factors that has led the Court to defer to legislative
determinations regarding penalogical policy. The Mitchell court
thus rightly held that the decision to allow age considerations in
sentencing resides with the Minnesota legislature.
B. Kids and the Threshold
Proportionality analysis, however, is not the only way to
approach the issue of considering age as a mitigating factor at
sentencing. Most people have a visceral sense that children are
different from adults. A good deal of social science research on the
developmental stages of the maturing process confirms this
impression. 160 These differences have also been the source of a
157. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1982)
(upholding life sentence for child); State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) (same); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
158. See Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989).
159. Although disagreeing as to the very existence of proportionality
considerations in noncapital sentencing, both Scalia and the dissenters in Harmelin
criticized Justice Kennedy's concurrence for opening up the possibility of judicial
subjectivism by introducing the threshold as a precursor to engaging in the more
objective inter- and intra-jurisdictional analysis. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986
(stating that "the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of
subjective values"); id. at 1020 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that Kennedy's
approach makes "any attempt at an objective proportionality analysis futile").
160. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 102-15
(1997) (arguing that the findings of developmental psychology provide persuasive
evidence of the stages of children's cognitive and volitional development and thus
provide a sensible basis from which to treat youth as a mitigating factor in adult
court sentences); see also Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal
Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 709, 716 (1997) (proposing "explicit transfer decision-making guidelines for
judges," required competency hearings prior to transfer, and extended juvenile
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good deal of legal analysis of children and criminality. 161 For
instance, much of the legal research points to the conclusion that
most juvenile offenders will "age out" of their criminality. 162 Such
facts should be central to assessments of appropriate penalties and
should be in the power of a court to consider. 163 Developmental
differences between adults and children have led several scholars
to recommend the introduction of proportionality review in the
sentencing of children in adult court.164 While this argument
satisfies intuition and logic, it ignores the extent to which the law
accommodates for these differences.
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has held that the
range of fundamental rights is not the same for children as it is for
adults. 165 The reason this conclusion is not immediately applied to
children being sentenced in adult court is because the Court has
reached these decisions where the rights of children were being
curtailed to a greater extent than would be cognizable for
adults. 66  There is no reason, however, that the special
constitutional status of children cannot also be used to recognize
that in certain situations more protection should be ensured.
Limitations on the fundamental rights of children point to a
persuasive rationale for the necessity of allowing for age
considerations when sentencing children in adult criminal court.
Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of long
sentences in adult prisons.' 67 A child will not just spend time in
jurisdiction mechanisms based on actuarial tables generated by empirical study by
social scientists).
161. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 160 at 102-15 (discussing how children's
psychological development justifies mitigation of adult sentences).
162. See FELD, supra note 16, at 199-200.
163. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 16, at 279 (arguing that a "coherent waiver
policy" must provide for special considerations of age at sentencing for youths in
adult court).
164. See Feld, supra note 160, at 102 (arguing that children should receive
proportionally lesser sentences than adults because "they have not yet fully
internalized moral norms, developed sufficient empathetic identification with
others, acquired adequate moral comprehension, or had sufficient opportunity to
develop the ability to restrain their actions" and basing this conclusion largely on
the findings of developmental psychology); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and
Punishmen" Imposing Life Without Parole On Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
681 (1998) (arguing that appellate courts need to modify the existing
proportionality analysis when assessing the constitutionality of life without parole
imposed on youths); see also Zimring, supra note 16.
165. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
treatment of minors' constitutional rights).
166. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Courts
various rationales for differential treatment of minors' constitutional rights).
167. See Julie B. Falis, Statutory Exclusion-When the Protector Becomes the
Abuser, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 81, 101-02 (1998) (citing national studies showing
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prison but will effectively be reared in the prison environment. 168
A child offender emerges from prison, if at all, having known no
adult existence except that of prison. In addition, there can be no
question that a child will be more "particularly vulnerable" in a
correctional facility than a fully mature adult. 169  Prisoners
maneuver through many unsupervised situations and a child will
have to make special accommodations to ensure his safety in many
of these situations.170
Children are also recognized as different because they have
not fully developed the ability to make informed, mature
decisions.' 7' The decision to commit a crime necessarily involves
the weighing of potential consequences, and the state enforces
many laws based on the recognition that children do not possess
the same decision-making capacity as adults. 172 Age limits for
that children have a 500% higher chance to be sexually assaulted in an adult
facility than in a juvenile facility); Thomas F. Geraghty and Will Rhee, Learning
Front Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 595, 645 (1998) (noting that "[clhildren are particularly vulnerable
to prison brutality when incarcerated with adults").
168. Another aspect of a child's "particular vulnerability" to lengthy prison
sentences is a child's different subjective experience of time. See FELD, supra note
16, at 313-14. As Professor Feld notes, "[a]lthough we measure penalties in units of
time-days, months, or years-youths and adults subjectively and objectively
conceive of and experience similar lengths of time differently." Id. at 313. Giving a
helpful analogy, Professor Feld states that "if we think of a sentence as a fraction of
our life and conceive of our age as the denominator, then the same numerator will
make up a larger proportion of a young person's life than of an older individual's."
Id. at 314; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective On Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM.
& CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997) (examining these developmental issues).
169. See supra notes 167-168 (citing examples of the ways in which children are
especially susceptible to the dangers of the prison environment).
170. See D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D. Or. 1982) (noting that
prison guards "do not invite child-adult communication; however, they cannot
prevent it").
171. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (outlining reasons for
limiting minors' constitutional rights).
172. Again, this recognition is borne out by the research of developmental
psychologists. See FELD, supra note 16, at 306-13. Although "social psychologists
find few bases on which to distinguish the quality of decisions made by adolescents
fifteen years of age or older from those made by adults in terms of either their
reasoning processes, the information used, or the qualitative outcomes," Professor
Feld notes that "[miore recent research indicates that child development occurs
more continuously and gradually, rather than as an all-or-nothing invariant stage
and sequence." Id. at 307-08. Feld notes further that children's "developmentally
influenced cost-benefit calculus may induce them to weigh benefits and
consequences differently and to discount negative future consequences in ways that
may systematically skew the quality of their choices." Id. at 311. These social
science findings lead Feld to conclude that "predisposition to risk taking reflects
generic developmental processes, rather than malevolent personal choices," and
thus provides a basis from which to construct a sentencing policy that protects
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consuming alcoholic beverages, for driving privileges and for
voting are obvious examples. Perhaps more pertinent are state
laws imposing curfews on youths. 173 Seeking to both prevent
juvenile participation in crime and to protect juveniles from the
effects of crime, curfews represent a legal response to perceived
limits of minors' decision-making capability. 174  This legal
recognition of a child's limited ability to make informed decisions
should apply with equal force to the way society responds to
children who have exercised that limited choice-making faculty to
commit a crime.
Conclusion
Eric Mitchell will not be eligible to rejoin society until 2028.
He will be 45 years old. The Minnesota district court was forced to
incarcerate a fifteen-year-old boy without the ability to consider
that he was a child. Given the strictness of Minnesota's
Sentencing Guidelines, the moment of certification to adult court
determined Mitchell's sentence. That transfer decision centered
solely upon the available dispositions in juvenile court and their
ability to protect the public from an adolescent offender. Eric
Mitchell faced either the six years available in a juvenile
disposition or a thirty year sentence in adult court. As the
Minnesota statutes now stand, there is no middle ground. The
structure of certification and adult sentencing forces age
considerations in adult sentencing to fall through the cracks. The
Mitchell court voiced frustration with its lack of power to consider
age in sentencing.
The law's response to serious youth offenders should be
informed by the same concerns that inform the larger legal setting
youths operate in on a daily basis. For the most part, this setting
seeks to protect children by affording a diminished range of legal
rights and constitutional protection. The policy considerations
that sanction such curtailment of rights leads logically to a greater
range of protection in the arena of criminal sentencing. As one
scholar has noted, "it would be ludicrous to argue that the policy
toward youth which so heavily influences... other cases should be
considered totally irrelevant in those exceptional cases in which
jurisdictional transfer occurs."'175 By moving a child to adult
youth from the "detrimental consequences of immature decisions." Id. at 312.
173. See supra note 98 (citing sources discussing the issue of curfew laws).
174. See Privor, supra note 98, at 423 (stating that "curfew legislation focuses on
both prevention of youth-perpetrated crimes and avoidance of youth victimization").
175. Zimring, supra note 16, at 279.
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criminal court with no protections against full adult penalties, the
state short-changes the legal rights of children.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that it is not
empowered to create sentencing policy, that such policy decisions
belong to the realm of the legislature. The Mitchell court also,
however, voiced serious misgivings about its responsibility to
administer a sentencing regime that does not allow for the
consideration of youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing the
most serious juvenile offenders. This circumspection should point
the legislature towards a reconsideration of the treatment of
children in adult court. Youth should constitute a mitigating
factor at sentencing for three reasons: the visceral sense that
children are different than adults; the developmental psychology
and sociological data that legal scholars find provides empirical
support for recognizing the differences of youth; and the
differential treatment children already receive from the law rooted
in the jurisprudential framework the Supreme Court applies to
assessing the fundamental rights of children. These three factors
are compelling reasons to heed the call of Mitchell and to stop the
practice of inflicting grossly disproportionate sentences upon
children.

